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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

KELLY JAMES PICCIRILLO,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 940641-CA

Priority No. 2

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from convictions for distribution of
a controlled substance (methamphetamine), an enhanced first
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-378(1) (a) (ii) and 58-37-8 (1) (b) (i) (1994); possession of a
controlled substance (methamphetamine), an enhanced first degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv) and
58-37-8(1) (b) (i) (1994); and possession of drug paraphernalia, a
class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5(l)
(1994) .
STATEMENT OF ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Did the trial court properly admit a certified copy of
defendant's prior drug related felony conviction during the guilt
phase of trial?
The trial court has "a good deal of discretion" to
admit evidence under rule 404(b), Utah Rule's of Evidence.

State

v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 938 (Utah 1994) (,f[o]ther rulings on the
admission of evidence entail a good deal of discretion") (dicta).

See State v. Tanner, 675 P.2d 539, 546 (Utah 1983); United States
v. Patterson, 20 F.3d 809, 813 (10th Cir.), cert, denied, 115
S.Ct. 128 (1994).

See also State v. Stevenson, 884 P.2d 1287,

1290 (Utah App. 1994) ("A trial court's decision regarding
admissibility of evidence is generally accorded 'a good deal of
discretion' by an appellate court." (quoting Pena, 869 P.2d at
938)).

But cJU State v. O'Neil, 848 P.2d 694, 698-99 (Utah App.

1993) (holding the trial court's 404(b) determination constitutes
a legal question reviewed for correctness), cert, denied, 859
P.2d 585 (Utah 1993).

The appellate courts accord trial courts

considerable freedom to admit or exclude evidence under rule 403,
Utah Rule's of Evidence.

Pena, 689 P.2d at 937-38 (dicta).

See

also State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 239-40 (Utah 1992)
(reviewing trial court's rule 403 ruling for "reasonability").
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Rule of Evidence 403:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded
if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury, or by considerations of undue delay,
waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence.
Utah Rule of Evidence 404(b):
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is
not admissible to prove the character of a
person in order to show action in conformity
therewith. It may, however, be admissible
for other purposes, such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident.

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with possession and distribution
of methamphetamine, both enhanced to first degree felonies under
Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37-8 (1) (a) and 58-37-8 (1) (b) (i) (1994); and
possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5(l) (1994) (R. 43-44).
Following a jury trial held May 19, 1994, defendant was
convicted as charged (R. 71-72).
The trial court imposed two five to 15 year terms in
the Utah State Prison for the first degree felonies and a six
month jail term for the third degree felony, all terms to run
concurrently (R. 99-101) .
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
In February 1994, Garrick Hafen, a then confidential
informant working with Washington County law enforcement,
arranged to make a controlled buy of methamphetamine from
defendant (R. 204-07, 331-32, 334). Hafen called defendant's St.
George motel room from the Hurricane Police Department, on
February 7, 1994, to find out when defendant would have
methamphetamine available for sale (R. 207, 332-33).2

A few

days later, on February 10, 1994, Hafen met with police at the
St. George Police Department to set up a controlled buy with
defendant for that afternoon (R. 211, 334).

1

The telephone conversation was recorded and admitted at
trial (R. 347, Exh. #1).
3

Prior to the controlled buy, Hafen, his wife (who
accompanied him on the buy), and their car were searched (R. 212,
220, 251, 338). Hafen was then equipped with a body wire or
listening device and provided one $20 bill and one $10 bill (both
of which had been previously photocopied) to make the buy (R.
216, 335-37; Exh. #9).
Police maintained both visual and audio contact with
the Hafens as they drove from the police department to
defendant's motel where they arrived at approximately 4:30 p.m.
(R. 211, 221). Once the Hafens were admitted into defendant's
motel room, police overheard defendant sell Hafen one half gram
of methamphetamine (R. 223).
Specifically, Hafen asked defendant if he had any
methamphetamine (R. 223, 339). Defendant indicated that he did,
and Hafen asked for a "quarter" (one-fourth gram) (R. 223).
Defendant stated that he only had "half bindles made up" (onehalf gram) (R. 223, 339), and also commented that he was
"paranoid" having the methamphetamine around (R. 223). Because
Hafen had only $30.00 with him, defendant agreed to let Hafen
take a half bindle of methamphetamine on Hafen's promise to come
back later that afternoon with more money (R. 223, 345; Exh.
#10) .2
Immediately following the controlled buy, police met
with Hafen at a pre-arranged location approximately two and one

2

The conversation between defendant and Hafen was
recorded and admitted at trial (R. 342-43; Exh. #4).
4
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bill

open and obvious view was also seized, including a pen pipe with
a glass bowl and a propane burner (R. 23 6, 3 04; Exh. #16).
Defendant, who was alone in the room at the time, was
hand-cuffed and provided Miranda3 warnings (R. 235, 299) .
Defendant told Officer Seegmiller he had been staying in the room
for approximately one week (R. 236). When Officer Seegmiller
asked defendant (who was on probation from a prior drug-related
conviction) "if he would be dirty if he was given a urine test"
(R. 239). With his head down, defendant said, "Yeah" (R. 239).
Approximately 15 minutes into the search, Freda
returned to the motel room (R. 242, 303-04), and, upon
discovering the officers, stated that she had left to sell drugs
and to buy groceries with a $10 bill defendant had just given
her.

Id.
At trial, Freda testified on defendant's behalf,

claiming that the motel room was hers, that defendant was just
visiting, and that he did not know that she had agreed to supply
methamphetamine for Hafen (R. 355, 358-59).
Defendant similarly testified that he was unaware his
mother had the methamphetamine in the 12' by 6' motel room (R.
369, 374). While defendant admitted that he had sold to Hafen in
the past, and that he met with Hafen on February 10, 1994, he
denied making a drug transaction at that time (R. 369). Rather,
defendant claimed that the taped conversation introduced into
evidence had in fact occurred one year prior (R. 373), and that
3

See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
6
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED DEFENDANT'S
PRIOR CONVICTION DURING THE GUILT PHASE OF
TRIAL UNDER RULES 403 AND 404(b), UTAH RULES
OF EVIDENCE; MOREOVER, ADMISSION OF THE
EVIDENCE DOES NOT UNDERMINE CONFIDENCE IN THE
JURY VERDICT
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1994) provides for the
enhancement of drug related convictions when a defendant has
previously been convicted for felony offense thereunder.4
Accordingly, defendant was charged and convicted for enhanced
first degree felony counts of drug distribution and possession,
based on his prior conviction for a drug related felony.
On appeal, defendant claims prejudicial error based on
the trial court's denial of his motion to bifurcate the trial,
which procedure would have precluded the jury's consideration of
his previous conviction unless or until their determination of
his guilt on the charged offenses.

Br. of App. at 6-10.

While a

bifurcated proceeding would normally be required, defendant's
argument overlooks the admissibility of his prior conviction
during the guilt phase of trial as both relevant and probative of
his knowledge intent and identity under Utah Rules of Evidence
403 and 404(b).
Section 58-37-8(1)(b)(i) provides:
Any person convicted of violating Subsection
(1)(a) with respect to a substance classified
in Schedule I or II is guilty of a second
degree felony and upon a second or subsequent
conviction of Subsection (1)(a) is guilty of
a first degree felony.
8
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Vefen.se counsel based

his request for a bifurcated proceeding on rule 4 03 arguing that
otherwise relevant evidence should be excluded if its prejudicial
effect outweighs its probative value (R. 194), see Addendum A.
However, defense counsel further indicated his belief that
defendant's prior drug related conviction was "an element of the
offense [s]" charged and that it had "great probative value," but
"that under [r]ule 403 and in order to afford [defendant] due
process of law and a fair trial," the trial should be bifurcated
(R. 194), see Addendum A.
In ruling on defense counsel's request for a bifurcated
proceeding, the trial court found that no prejudice resulted from
the reading of the Amended Information to the jury, as "[t]hey
have been repeatedly instructed that those are merely
allegations" (R. 194), see Addendum A.

However, the trial court

delayed further ruling on the requested bifurcated procedure:
With respect to the process of the trial, []
I am going to order that with the presenting
of the evidence, that the very last thing
that the State may put in before it rests -and make no reference to it until such prior
time -- is the prior conviction upon which
the enhancement of both Count I and II are
based. That will allow the Court the
opportunity to specifically make the decision
as to whether or not that evidence should
come in, weighing all of the State's evidence
in light of Rule 4 03 of the Rules of
Evidence, prejudicial value versus probative
effect, and Rule 404(b) of the Rules of
Evidence, evidence admissible for other
purposes, such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity or absence of mistake or
accident, until the case is -- the State's
case in chief is shown to me in its entirety.
Absent that matter, I will not have a
satisfactory evidentiary basis in order to
10
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just the innocent, albeit ill-fated, son of a drug-dealing
mother.
At the conclusion of the State's case-in-chief, the
prosecutor requested to approach the bench and the trial court
and counsel again conferred off the record (R. 352) (the
pertinent transcript pages are attached as Addendum B ) .
Immediately following this conference, the trial court noted that
the prosecutor had offered a certified copy of the Judgment,
Sentence and Commitment for defendant's previous drug related
conviction (R. 352; Exh. #12)5, see Addendum B.

Defense counsel

renewed his objection to the evidence "on the same grounds that I
put on the record at the time I made my Motion in Limine, a
motion to bifurcate" (R. 353), see Addendum B.

The trial court

summarily overruled defendant's objection and admitted the
evidence (R. 353), see Addendum B.
B.

Waiver on Appeal

In his Summary of Argument defendant broadly asserts
that the trial court erred in allowing his prior conviction "to
be made known to the jury in the reading of the Amended
Information and in allowing the introduction of defendant's prior
conviction in the form of State's Exhibit 12." Br. of App. at 5.
However, defendant's Argument focuses exclusively on the trial
court's alleged erroneous admission of the prior conviction under
rule 403.

Br. of App. at 6-12.

He has not further developed his

5

Defendant has not requested that any of the exhibits
admitted at trial be made part of the record on appeal (R. 104).
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requested a bifurcated procedure under evidentiary rule 4 03 for
purposes of introducing his prior conviction at trial (R. 19394), see Addendum A.

The reading of the Amended Information to

the jury however, does not raise an admissibility question under
rule 403.

Defendant's reliance on a rule of evidence is

inadequate to preserve a possible objection to the reading of the
Amended Information.

The record is simply silent as to whether,

and on what precise legal grounds defendant objected to the
reading of the Amended Information in this case.

State v.

Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1144-45 (Utah 1989) (!IXA general rule of
appellate review in criminal cases in Utah is that a
contemporaneous objection or some form of specific

preservation

of claims of error must be made a part of the trial court record
before an appellate court will review such claim on appeal.'")
(quoting State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 551 (Utah 1987)).

Thus,

any issue concerning the propriety of the court's reading of the
Amended Information to the jury is waived.

Defendant has not

asserted that there are unusual circumstances justifying his
failure to preserve his objection below.

State v. Archambeau,

820 P.2d 920, 922 (Utah App. 1992) . Consequently, the only issue
properly before the Court concerns the admission of defendant's
prior conviction during the guilt phase of trial.6

6

Even assuming that the Court determines the record and
defendant's brief are adequate to preserve the issue, any error
resulting from the reading of the Amended Information to the jury
constitutes harmless error for the same reasons admission of the
prior conviction at trial fails to undermine confidence in the
outcome, discussed in Part E, infra.
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C.

Discretionary Standard of Review

This Court has previously applied a bifurcated standard
of review to the admissibility of other crimes evidence under
rule 404(b).
1993).

State v. O'Neil, 848 P.2d 694, 698 (Utah App.

Specifically, the Court viewed the admission of the

evidence as a legal question and applied a correctness standard.
Id,

However, the trial court's subsidiary factual findings were

given deference and reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard.
Id.

at 698-99. As support for this bifurcated approach to the

admissibility of evidence, the Court relied upon what was then
the Utah Supreme Court's most recent exegesis on appropriate
standards of review, State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1270 n. 11
(Utah 1993).

Because the supreme court has since clarified and

refined its articulation of the standards for reviewing trial
court rulings, State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994), the
bifurcated approach followed in O'Neil should be reconsidered.
Indeed, the Court has since recognized Pena's deferential review
of evidentiary rulings in State v. Stevenson, 884 P.2d 1287, 1290
(Utah App. 1994) (affirming trial court's refusal to allow
impeachment of State's witness with prior convictions which did
not meet criteria of rule 609, Utah Rules of Evidence).
In Pena, the supreme court clarified that "the universe
of questions presented for review" includes more than just
"mutually exclusive questions of fact or law."
Indeed, it also includes a "third category —

869 P.2d at 936.

the application of

law to fact or, stated more fully, the determination of whether a
15

given set of facts comes within the reach of a given rule of
law."

Id.

While theoretically, "the effect of a given set of

facts is a question of law and, therefore one on which an
appellate court owes no deference to a trial court's
determination[,]" Pena clarifies that as a practical matter,
application of a legal rule to a set of facts often "embodies a
defacto grant of discretion which permits the trial court to
reach one of several possible conclusions about the legal effect
of a particular set of facts without risking reversal."
937.

Id. at

Admissibility determinations fall into this third,

application of law to fact, category.

Id. at 938.

As to the precise range of trial court discretion in
applying law to a given set of facts, the supreme court described
the standards of review as a spectrum "consisting of many shades
of variance" where the "closeness of appellate review of the
application of law to fact actually runs the entire length of
this spectrum." 869 P.2d at 938.

In so describing the standards,

Pena expressly notes that determinations to admit or exclude
evidence under rule 4 03 fall at the "broad end of the spectrum"
where the appellate courts accord "considerable freedom in
applying a legal principle to the facts, freedom to make
decisions which appellate judges might not make themselves ab
initio but will not reverse --in effect, creating the freedom to
be wrong without incurring reversal."

Id. at 937-38.

See also

State v. Hamilton, 827 P,2d 232, 239-40 (Utah 1992) (a trial
court's rule 403 determination warrants reversal only if it
16

exceeds the limits of reasonability as a matter of law).
Significantly, the supreme court further noted " [o]ther rulings
on the admission of evidence also generally entail a good deal of
discretion."

Id. at 938. Although not specifically identified,

rule 4 04(b) determinations presumably are included.

See also

State v. Tanner, 675 P.2d 539, 546 (Utah 1983) (a trial court has
discretion to admit or exclude evidence under rule 4 04(b)).
Accordingly, consistent with Pena, the Court should
recognize the trial court's broad latitude in reviewing the
admission of defendant's prior conviction under rule 404(b).
D. Elemental Evidentiary Purpose for
Admission of Prior Crimes Evidence Defeats
Necessity for Bifurcated Proceeding
Significantly, defendant did not dispute the relevance
of his prior conviction under rule 404(b) in the trial court. He
has done so only nominally on appeal.

Br. of App. at 10.

Rather, as noted previously, defendant argues primarily that he
was entitled to a bifurcated proceeding below in order to
facilitate the balancing requirements of rule 403. Id.
Generally, a bifurcated procedure is required where, as
here, the charged offense is capable of enhancement based on a
jury's finding that the defendant has been previously convicted
of a related offense.

See State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 492-98

(Utah 1988) (Zimmerman, J., concurring in the result) (holding
that plain language of aggravated sexual abuse statute
contemplated a bifurcated procedure in which guilt of the
underlying charge is determined prior to the jury's consideration
17

of prior crimes for enhancement purposes).

See also State v.

James, 767 P.2d 549, 557 (Utah 1989) (adopting bifurcated
procedure advanced in Bishop and applying it to homicide
statute).

As recognized in Bishop, bifurcation is necessary in

such a circumstance to avoid the improper "aggregation of issues
and evidence" during the guilt phase of trial.

Id. at 498.

Where, however, there is an elemental evidentiary purpose, other
than enhancement, for admission of prior crimes evidence, a
bifurcated procedure is unnecessary.

Indeed, the State is

"entitled" to offer prior crimes evidence to establish disputed
critical elements such as knowledge and intent under rule 404(b).
O'Neil, 848 P.2d at 701. As set forth below, defendant's prior
conviction was admissible during the guilt phase of trial for an
evidentiary purpose unrelated to enhancement; thus, the trial
court correctly denied his request for a bifurcated procedure.
1.

Rule 404(b)

Although the trial court did not expressly state the
basis for its ruling admitting defendant's prior conviction at
the conclusion of the State's case-in-chief, the reasonable
inference from the record is that the conviction was properly
admitted to establish defendant's disputed knowledge and intent
and identity under rule 404(b).7
7

O'Neil, 848 P.2d at 701

Rule 404(b) provides:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is
not admissible to prove the character of a
person in order to show action in conformity
therewith. It may, however, be admissible
for other purposes, such as proof of motive,
18

(allowing admission of prior conviction to establish knowledge
and intent to refute O'Neil's defense that he "'knew nothing'").
Indeed, as noted in part A, supra, the trial court initially
reserved ruling on defendant's motion to bifurcate the trial in
order to further consider the matter under the rule. And, as
further noted in Part A, supra, defendant's cross-examinations of
the State's witnesses put at issue his knowledge, intent and
identity as the drug dealer.
Rule 404(b) is recognized by this Court as an
inclusionary rule which does not operate to exclude evidence
unless it fits an exception; but rather allows admission of
relevant evidence unless offered solely to show the defendant's
bad character.

O'Neil. 848 P.2d at 700. Accord State v.

Featherson, 781 P.2d 424, 426 (Utah 1989).

"Thus, Rule 404

allows prior bad act evidence in a criminal trial where it is
offered to show any element of the alleged crime."
P.2d at 700.

O'Neil, 848

See also Featherson, 781 P.2d at 426 ("[w]hen

[other acts] evidence may establish constitutive elements of the
crime . . . it is admissible even though it tends to prove that
the defendant has committed other crimes").

Further, rule 404(b)

specifically recognizes knowledge, intent and identity as matters
properly addressed by other acts evidence.

Moreover, as further

recognized by this Court, knowledge and intent are

fl

[e] ssential

elements" of the drug-related crimes for which defendant was
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident.
19

convicted.

O'Neil, 848 P.2d at 700.

See also State v. Olsen,

869 P.2d 1004, 1010 (Utah App. 1994) (Olsen's prior bad acts
admissible to disprove his defense that he lacked intent to
murder victim); State v. Morrell, 803 P.2d 292, 295 (Utah App.
1990) (where Morrell's intent was contested issue, State could
discredit his theory of events with prior crimes evidence); State
v. Tavlor, 818 P.2d 561, 569-70 (Utah App. 1991) (citing with
approval federal cases in which evidence of prior drug related
crimes was permitted to establish knowledge and intent in
narcotics prosecutions).
In short, defendant's prior drug related conviction was
probative of matters other than his criminal propensity;
specifically, it helped to refute his claims of ignorance and
lack of intent and to establish that he, not his mother, sold the
methamphetamine to Hafen.

Accordingly, the trial court did not

exceed its discretion by admitting the evidence.8

8

Even applying the bifurcated standard of review set
forth in O'Neil, the record supports the correctness of the trial
court's admissibility ruling. Indeed, as previously noted in
Part D, supra, defendant has only nominally challenged the
admissibility of his prior conviction under rule 404(b) on appeal
and has made no effort to challenge the court's implicit,
subsidiary factual determinations. See State v. Drobel, 815 P.2d
724, 734 (Utah App.) ("An appellant raising issues of fact on
appeal must, . . . marshal all the evidence supporting the trial
court's findings, and then show that evidence to be insufficient"
and/or clearly erroneous), cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah
1991).
20

2.

Rule 403

The trial court's ruling similarly passes muster under
rule 403,9 requiring that the probative value of prior crimes
evidence outweigh the potential for unfair prejudice.

O'Neil,

848 P.2d at 701. There are several factors for consideration in
making a rule 403 determination including: the strength of the
other crimes evidence, the similarities between the other crimes
and the charged offense, the temporal proximity between the two,
the efficacy of alternative proof, or the degree to which the
other crimes evidence will rouse the jury to over-mastering
hostility.

State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291, 296 (Utah 1984).10

Here, defendant's prior felony drug conviction
constituted strong evidence of his prior drug related activity.
O'Neil, 848 P.2d at 701 ("A documented conviction is the

9

Rule 403 provides:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded
if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury, or by considerations of undue delay,
waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence.

10

Defendant's rule 403 analysis is inadequate under the
briefing rule and should be rejected. Utah R. App. Pro.
24 ()a) (9) (requiring appellant to set forth contentions and
reasons for claim of error). See Price, 827 P.2d at 249
(declining to reach merits of appeal due to inadequate legal
analysis). Defendant merely acknowledges the applicable Shickles
criteria, wholly failing to engage in legal analysis of the
probative value of his conviction. Br. of App. at 11-12.
Rather, defendant makes the singular broad and unsupported claim
that the admission of his prior conviction "served no purpose
other than to 'rouse the jury to over mastering hostility.'" Br.
of App. at 12.
21

strongest possible evidence of a prior crime).

The prior

conviction was also for drug distribution (R. 381, Exh. #12), an
offense substantively indistinguishable from the charged offenses
of drug possession and distribution.

O'Neil, 848 P.2d at 701

(finding prior conviction for distribution of small amount of
controlled substance sufficiently similar to charged distribution
offense to permit admission).

Additionally, defendant's prior

drug conviction was very close in time to the instant charges,
having been entered within the previous seven months (R. 3 81).
O'Neil, 848 P.2d at 701 (holding three year difference between
prior crime and the incidents leading to the charged crime was
sufficiently close in time to justify admission).

And, while the

State may have had other evidence of defendant's identity,
knowledge and intent from its witnesses, defendant's prior
conviction is not barred on that ground alone.

Shickles, 760

P.2d at 296 (holding prior crime evidence not barred even though
State had adduced other evidences of Shickle's intent, including
Shickle's own statements, "particularly because intent [was a]
hotly contested issue [].").
Finally, a simple drug distribution charge is not
likely to rouse a jury to overmastering hostility.

O'Neil, 84 8

P.2d at 701; Taylor, 818 P.2d at 572 ("unlike other more heinous
or inflammatory types of prior bad act evidence," Taylor's prior
conviction for marijuana possession was not necessarily likely to
arouse jury to "overriding hostility").

Nor is there any

indication that it did so in this case.

Indeed, the prior

22

conviction was not emphasized by the court or the prosecutor at
the time of its admission (R. 352-53), see Addendum B, nor was it
emphasized by the prosecutor in his closing argument to the jury.
Rather, the prosecutor stated briefly that the prior conviction
was an element the jury was required to find and that proof of
that could be found in Exhibit #12, a certified copy of
defendant's previous conviction for drug distribution (R. 38 081) .
Based on the above, the trial court was within its
discretion to conclude that defendant's prior conviction was at
least as probative as it was prejudicial.
E. Admission of Defendant's Prior Conviction
Does Not Undermine Confidence in the Verdict
Even assuming this Court finds the record on appeal is
inadequate to support the trial court's admission of defendant's
prior conviction under rules 403 and 404(b), admission of the
evidence does not undermine confidence in the verdict.

"The

standard for reversal in cases involving an erroneous failure to
exclude prior convictions is whether absent the error, there was
a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for the
defendant."

State v. Bruce, 779 P.2d 646, 656 (Utah 1989); State

v. Diaz, 859 P.2d 19, 23 (Utah App. 1993), cert, denied, 878 P.2d
1154 (Utah 1994).

See also State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 240

(Utah 1992) (recognizing that the "'reasonable likelihood'"
standard is more concretely articulated as requiring reversal
only where the error is such that confidence in the verdict is

23

undermined (citing State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 920 (Utah
1987)).
In determining whether a particular error is harmless,
the Court considers "'a host of factors, including . . . the
overall strength of the State's case.'" Olsen, 869 P.2d at 1011
(quoting Hamilton, 827 P.2d at 240).

Indeed, "[t]he more

evidence supporting the verdict, the less likely there was
harmful error."
was overwhelming.

Id.

Here, the State's case against defendant

The bulk of the incriminating evidence against

defendant resulted from a controlled drug transaction which was
closely monitored by law enforcement.

Police informant Garrick

Hafen arranged a drug buy with defendant over the telephone (R.
332-34).

Hafen recognized defendant's voice, having "been

around" defendant for approximately six months at the time the
call was made (R. 334).
At the time of the subsequent sale, Hafen went to
defendant's motel room and asked defendant for a one-fourth
bindle of methamphetamine (R. 339). Defendant replied that he
had only half bindles "made up" for sale.

Id.

Because Hafen

only had $3 0 on him, defendant agreed that Hafen could take a
half bindle of methamphetamine on Hafen's promise to return with
an additional $3 0 in the next one-half hour.

Id.

Significantly, both the telephone conversation and the
actual drug sale were overheard and recorded by investigating
officers, whose testimony of the same corroborated Hafen's (R.
207-08, 211, 221, 223-224, 227, 288-91).
24

Moreover, both tape

recorded conversations were admitted into evidence and played for
the jury (R. 342-43, 347; Exh. ##1,4).
Further, the controlled buy facilitated a search
warrant for defendant's motel room which police executed
approximately one hour after the buy (R. 230). At that time,
police discovered defendant alone in the 6' by 12' motel room
surrounded, in open and obvious view, by methamphetamine bindles
and other drug paraphernalia (R. 231-33, 236, 242, 298-99, 302).
Additionally, police also recovered the $20 bill Hafen had given
defendant in exchange for the methamphetamine (R. 218; Exh. #9).
Finally, defendant attempted to explain the tape
recorded drug transaction with Hafen by conceding that he had in
fact sold drugs to Hafen in the past, but disputing that he had
done so on the date charged (R. 372-73).

Significantly,

defendant's concession does not amount to forced damage control
in response to the admission of his prior conviction; rather, it
is merely his explanation for the independently incriminating
recording.
The above compelling evidence abundantly supports the
trial outcome.

There is not a reasonable likelihood of a

different result absent the introduction of defendant's prior
conviction, nor is confidence in the jury verdict undermined.11
11

Both in the trial court and on appeal, defendant has
only nominally asserted that the alleged erroneous admission of
his prior conviction amounted to a denial of federal due process
(R. 194). Br. of App. at 12. He has at no time articulated a
state constitutional claim. It is therefore unnecessary for the
Court to consider whether the alleged error was harmless for
purposes of either the state or federal constitutions. State v.
25

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court should find that
defendant's prior conviction was properly admitted during the
guilt phase of trial as relevant and probative of his knowledge,
intent and identity under rules 4 03 and 4 04(b).

However, even

assuming the record is inadequate to support the trial court's
admissibility ruling, any error in the admission of defendant's
prior conviction is harmless in light of the overwhelming
evidence of his guilt.

This Court should therefore affirm

defendant's enhanced first degree felony convictions for drug
distribution and possession.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this J__[_ d a Y of January, 1995.
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

MARIAN DECKER
Assistant Attorney General

Webb, 779 P.2d 1108, 1111 n.4 (Utah 1989); State v. Bobo, 803
P.2d 1268, 1272 (Utah App. 1990). Even assuming the Court
determines that the alleged error in this case amounts to a
denial of due process, the overwhelming weight of the evidence
against defendant renders the alleged error harmless "beyond any
doubt." Bishop, 753 P.2d at 498 (noting that it is yet to be
determined "whether the harmless error standard applicable to
violations of the state constitution is the erosion of confidence
standard or the stricter federal 'harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt' standard." (citation omitted)).
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

53
proceedings.

It's a public courtroom, open at all times.

But if you want to leave, I'm going to excuse you now and
again thank you for being willing to come here.
Now, for those of you seated in the jury box,
and who have been selected to serve as a jury in this case,
I have one last oath to give you.

Would you please all

stand, face the clerk and raise your right hand and take
the oath to well and truly try the issues in this case.
(Whereupon, the jury was duly impanelled and
sworn to try the cause.)
THE COURT:

Thank you.

And please be seated.

Now, I'm going to give you a few instructions
very quickly about the case, and then we'll take a recess
so you can make some phone calls and tell people where
you're going to be at least for the rest of the day.

But

let me also tell you that as soon as we come back into
session, if you want to spread out more or get more
comfortable, please take advantage of that.

I only ask

that you kind of stay in the same spot that —

or at least

in the same order that you are so I can make sure that
we're not missing anybody when I take a quick look at the
jury box.
I'm going to now read some instructions I find
are helpful to give you at the outset of the case.
(Whereupon, Instructions 1 through 4 were read.)

PAULG.MCMULLIN
OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER

1

MR. TERRY:

May counsel approach?

2

THE COURT:

Certainly, Counsel.

3

(Whereupon, a discussion was had among Court

4

and counsel at the bench out of the hearing of

5

the jury, which was not recorded.)

6

THE COURT: May the record reflect that

7

Mr. Terry, in behalf of the defendant, has approached the

8

Court in order to secure a record on a specific objection

9

that he wants to bring to the Court's attention.

10

And we'll

do that at the first recess where we release the jury.

11

You may read the Information.

12

(Whereupon, the clerk of the court read the

13
14
15

Information.)
THE COURT:

Thank you.

Instruction No. 5,

"Evidence and Stipulations."

16

(Whereupon, Instructions 5 and 6 were read.)

17

THE COURT:

Now, at this point, members of the

18

jury, I'm going to take a recess until 10:30.

19

I have some things that we need to put on the record in

20

your absence, and also I want to give you that chance to

21

get up and stand a bit, walk around, make any phone calls

22

you need to make. We'll come back into session at 10:30.

23

But remember that admonition that I gave you earlier.

24
25

Counsel and

You are instructed or admonished that during
this recess or any future break in the trial, you're not to

PAUL G. MCMULLIN
OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
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1

discuss the case with anyone or among yourselves nor to

2

form or express any opinion as to the innocence or guilt of

3

the defendant until the matter is submitted to you.

4

we'll come back into session at 10:30.

And

5

(Whereupon, a discussion was had among Court

6

and counsel in open court out of the hearing of

7

the jury, which was recorded as follows:)

8

THE COURT: And the record will reflect that the

9

jury has departed, and the door is closed.

10

Mr. Terry, the record should also reflect that I

11

gave you an opportunity at the bench prior to the taking of

12

peremptory challenges to give to the Court a challenge as

13

to leaving on the jury Mr. Woods, who was a — a

14

prospective juror.

15

used their first peremptory challenge to strike Mr. Woods.

16

The record should show that the defense

It is also the position, if I'm not mistaken,

17

Mr. Terry, that because of the business relationship where

18

Mr. Seegmiller, one of the State's witnesses, serves in a

19

part-time capacity as a driveway cleaner or a parking lot

20

cleaner for Mr. Woods' business, that you had a challenge

21

for cause on that basis.

22

Am I accurate?

23

MR. TERRY:

That's correct, Your Honor.

24

Mr. Seegmiller is an industrious young man and has

25

businesses interests in addition to his calling as a police

PAUL G. MCMULLIN
OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
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1

officer.

2

there was some other business relationship, although I'd

3

forgotten exactly what it was. And I think that based on

4

the close proximity in time to this trial of the last

5

business that the two transacted together, that required my

6

challenge for cause.

7
8
9
10

And as I stated at the bench, I was aware that

THE COURT: All right.

And your record is

made.
The State opposed that challenge.

Is that

accurate, Mr. Ludlow?

11

MR. LUDLOW:

That's correct, Your Honor.

12

THE COURT: All right.

And the Court ruled

13

against your challenge for cause at that time, and now the

14

record is made.

15

Mr. Terry, you also, immediately prior to the

16

clerk's reading of the Information this morning, wanted to

17

place a motion in limine before the Court to have the Court

18

make no reference to or any items on the record with

19

respect to Mr. Piccirillo's prior convictions as set forth,

20

in Counts I and II as charged in the Amended Information.

21

Let me give you this opportunity to complete that record

22

now in the absence of the jury.

23

MR. TERRY:

24

Yes. My motion would be in the form of a motion

25

Thank you, Your Honor.

in limine and motion to bifurcate at least with respect to

PAUL G. MCMULLIN

m
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1

any evidence that might be presented with —

as far as

2

prior convictions of Mr. Piccirillo.

3

grounds of Rules of Evidence 403, wherein it allows for

4

evidence that might otherwise be relevant to be excluded if

5

its prejudicial effect outweighs its probative value. And

6

clearly this is an element of the offense.

7

probative value.

8

offense as charged.

9

order to afford my client due process of law and a fair

That is made on the

It has great

It's key, obviously, to the degree of the
But I think that under Rule 403 and in

10

trial in this matter, it should be bifurcated.

The jury

11

should hear evidence with respect to the particular

12

transaction that forms the basis of the body of both

13

counts, and then if they make a finding against my client

14

with respect to that, then they would make a finding as to

15

whether or not —

16

Court or the jury.

17

Court, as a finder of fact, making a finding with respect

18

to the prior conviction.

19

not be made —

20

of —

21

elements in those two counts.

and, frankly, it could be either the
We would have no objection to the

But I feel like that that should

that that evidence should not be a part

of the trial on the other issues —

the other

22

THE COURT: All right.

Thank you, Counsel.

23

This is going to be the Court's ruling on that

24

particular issue. With respect to the reading of the

25

Information, I see no prejudice having been brought forth

PAULG.MCMULLIN
OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER

1

with the jury having heard the allegations in the

2

Information.

3

those are merely allegations.

4

They have been repeatedly instructed that

With respect to the process of the trial,

5

Mr. Ludlow, I am going to order that with the presenting of

6

the evidence, that the very last thing that the State may

7

put in before it rests —

8

such prior time —

9

enhancement of both Count I and II are based.

and make no reference to it until

is the prior conviction upon which the
That will

10

allow the Court the opportunity to specifically make the

11

decision as to whether or not that evidence should come in,

12

weighing all of the State's evidence in light of Rule 403

13

of the Rules of Evidence, prejudicial value versus

14

probative effect, and Rule 404(b) of the Rules of Evidence,

15

evidence admissible for other purposes, such as proof of

16

motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,

17

identity or absence of mistake or accident, until the case

18

is —

19

entirety.

20

satisfactory evidentiary basis in order to conduct the

21

weighing process that the Rules of Evidence require that I

22

engage in before admitting the evidence.

the State's case in chief is shown to me in its
Absent that matter, I will not have a

23

Any problem with that ruling, Mr. Ludlow?

24

MR. LUDLOW:

25

THE COURT: All right.

No, Your Honor.
That's the record.

PAUL G. MCMULLIN
OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
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lie under oath?

You know what those consequences would be?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And you've told the truth?

A.

I have.

Yes, I have.

MR. LUDLOW:

I have nothing further.

THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. Terry?
MR. TERRY:

No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

Thank you, Mr. Hafen.

You may step down.
May this witness be excused?
MR. LUDLOW:

Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

Mr. Hafen, you may

leave, or you can sit here in the courtroom if you want
to.

But you may leave if you wish.
MR. LUDLOW:

Your Honor, may counsel approach

the bench?
THE COURT:

Certainly, Counsel.

(Whereupon, a discussion was had among Court
and counsel at the bench out of the hearing of
the jury, which was not recorded.)
THE COURT: Mr. Ludlow, you offer State's
Exhibit No. 12, which is a certified copy of the Judgment,
Sentence, Stay of Execution of Sentence, Order of Probation
and Commitment in the case of State of Utah, plaintiff,
versus Kelly James Piccirillo, Washington County Case

PAULG.MCMULLIN
OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER

1

No. 931500375?

Is that your offer?

2

MR. LUDLOW:

3

THE COURT: Your response, Mr. Terry?

4

MR. TERRY: Your Honor, I renew my objection on

It is, Your Honor.

5

the same grounds that :E put on the record at the time I

6

made my Motion in Limine, a motion to bifurcate.

THE COURT: All right. Your objection was

7
8

overruled.

You do not <Dffer 13 or 15; is that correct,

9
10

Exhibit No . 12 is received.

Counsel?

11

MR. LUDLOW:

12

THE COURT:

13

That's correct, Your Honor.
13 and 15 are not marked or

identified or offered.

14

Anything else, Mr. Ludlow?

15

MR. LUDLOW:

16

Could I have just a minute, Your

Honor?

17

THE COURT: Certainly, Counsel.

18

(Discussion off the record.)

19

MR. LUDLOW: May counsel approach?

20

THE COURT: Certainly.

21

(Whereupon, a discussion was had among Court

22

and counsel at the bench out of the hearing of

23

the jury, which was not recorded.)

24

MR. LUDLOW:

25

THE COURT: All right. The State having rested,

Your Honor, the State would rest.
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